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This is a book of the first importance. First, it is a daring attempt to rethink the existential 
dialectic practiced by Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger and it offers a rigorous and sustained 
reading of some of their major texts. Second, it is also an example of a dialectical approach to 
writing philosophical history. Cumming, in this book, is a dialectician who distinguishes his 
dialectic from Hegel's (as do the thinkers he discusses) by insisting that an existential dialectic is 
open-ended, involves elements of dislocation, and will never culminate in a final synthesis. 
Cumming's dialectic is also to be differentiated from the Hegelian by its rejection of the notion 
of an absolute starting point. So Starting Point does not begin with the sense-certainty of the 
Phenomenology or with the Sein of the Logic but with a consideration of what it means to 
identify something as a philosophical movement. Cumming stresses the personal, social, and 
ontological senses of movement; he dislocates the expectations conventionally raised by his title 
by denying that there is any starting point other than the personal, understood in a sense which 
includes Kierkegaard's "that individual" and early Heidegger's stress on the Jemeinigkeit of 
Dasein. But, in contrast to the popular understanding of existentialism (which can find some 
support in a text such as Sartre's "Existentialism is a Humanism"), Cumming makes it clear that 
the starting point is not immediately available or obvious. To be at any starting point is to have a 
specific history involving dislocation and a struggle with self-deception. Human existence is to 
be understood in Heidegger's sense of Wiederholung as a constant attempt to come to terms with 
one's own historicity. To do that is to become aware of the stages or levels of human existence, 
as in Kierkegaard's or Sartre's analyses. Since Cumming rejects not only foundationalism but 
also the typical Anglo-American assumption of a clearcut distinction between philosophical 
principles and philosophical examples, he proceeds not by abstracting from his authors but by 
means of a close reading of their texts which includes an awareness of how they read one 
another. 
Yet in a brief review it is impossible to capture the concreteness characteristic of 
Cumming's interrogation of particular texts and his assessments of individual thinkers. Among 
the distinctive themes which emerge, I will mention only two: spatiality and the confrontation 
with Hegel. 
Spatiality: One traditional way of understanding continental philosophy, and in fact of 
establishing it as a tradition, is to see it as either moving back and forth between or combining 
Kant's emphasis on the temporality of human experience with Hegel's insight into its historical 
character. Cumming is aware of the truth of this view, but he believes that an existential dialectic 
also involves the sense both of site and place and of dislocation and disjunction (see chapter 3, 
"The Dislocated World"). He quotes Heidegger: "Dasein takes up space, and this is to be 
understood literally" (103). In developing a spatial thematics Cumming himself juxtaposes 
(through what he called a topological method in his first book, Human Nature and History) such 
topoi as Heideggerian Entfernung, Sartre's elucidation of the distance between the self and the 
other, and Kierkegaard's adaptation of Trendelenburg's critique of Hegel on the starting point: it 
must be real movement in space, not the abstract movement of the concept. Perhaps Cumming 
would like to follow the existentialists in spatializing time in a certain sense; however this is not 
done in the spirit which Bergson attributed to the tradition but as a way of preserving both a 
sense of genuine change and of places or "stages on life's way." Those who accept the one 
somewhat disingenuous statement in this book ("I have tried to write too for those not previously 
exposed," ix), will want to approach dislocation by means of Cumming's chapter on "The 
Wiggling Bottom," which glosses Sartre's attention to spatial movement. 
Hegel. It is not unusual to present existentialism as involving and even generating itself 
by means of a critique of Hegel. What is distinctive about Cumming's book here comes from his 
insistence that to understand existential dialectic we must see that the manner of writing or 
speaking, the form of communication is not just important but precisely what is at stake in 
existential philosophy. One sometimes finds such awareness of philosophy as a mode of 
discourse in English language discussions of Kierkegaard's indirect communication or of 
Nietzsche, a writer dismissed here for being overly biologistic, but Cumming has attempted to 
give a sustained account of all existential dialectic as a distinctive approach to discourse. As 
such, its great other is the Hegelian claim to absolute knowledge, to a universal language of an 
enlightened community based on full mutual recognition and self-knowledge. From a critical 
point of view, then, the crux of Hegelian philosophy (non-existential dialectic) is the transition 
from the aesthetic to the philosophical, which involves the claim that the apparent multiplicity 
and irreducibility of the artistic find their truth in the conceptual totality of absolute knowledge. 
It is at this reflective, meta philosophical level that Cumming sees Kierkegaard paradigmatically, 
but Sartre and Heidegger too, as shaping their own discourses which involve dislocating some 
rationalist contrasts between the philosophical and the poetic or rhetorical. Cumming gives a 
close reading of Kierkegaard's Either/Or as a critique of the system of Hegelian aesthetics and as 
a demonstration of Hegel's attempted escape from the rough edges of existence by a Schein 
which renders his own philosophy merely aesthetic. The title of the most relevant chapter here, 
"Finish" (ch. 11 ), refers to an ambiguity between an artistic or craftsmanlike final coat which 
preserves a work and makes it shine forth, and Hegel's claim to have brought philosophy to an 
end. Cumming reads Kierkegaard on the aphoristic versus the finished in relation to Hegel on the 
finish of the masterpieces of European painting as anticipating the luminosity of a completed 
philosophy. The reading, as usual, is somewhat dislocating, but grounded in both hermeneutic 
rigor and linguistic sensitivity.  
Cumming complicates his Starting Point by promising that it is to be followed by a 
second book which will offer an account of phenomenology, especially as practiced by Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty, from the standpoint of an existential dialectic. He justifies this reversal of 
the more usual expository order in which phenomenology precedes existentialism by citing the 
quirkiness of philosophical history in which English speaking readers have in fact generally been 
introduced to continental thinkers in this recapitulative, wiederholend manner. But I wonder 
whether a second volume alone can do justice to Cumming's ambitious attempt to clarify the 
nature of philosophy by means of existential reflection on ways of starting and ways of speaking. 
Noticeable in Cumming's topics, in his tone, and in his style of rigorous commentary and 
startling juxtaposition are some deep affinities with such post-existential writers as Derrida or 
Foucault. We should hope then not only to be able to read Cumming soon on the classical 
phenomenological line but also that he will eventually explain whether and how an existential 
dialectic differs from a philosophy of deconstruction and difference, to which it seems very close 
in the present book. 
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